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For many years, the military has understood the value and versatility of Unmanned Aerial
Systems (UAS). In the recent years, UASs have sparked the interest of other fields, and in
the very near future, they will be introduced into the National Airspace System (NAS).
With this inclusion come new concerns. Due to the future wide range applications for
UASs, it is important to explore factors, which may affect operator performance. The
UAS operator task differs from that of a manned aircraft pilot. An UAS operator does not
get the same sensory cues as a pilot and their field of vision is significantly restricted
among other limitations.
This study examined the effects of system reliability and task uncertainty on UAS
operator performance, measuring image processing accuracy and image processing time
through a primary task and three secondary tasks.

The primary task was image

processing that entailed differentiating between targets and distracters, making necessary
changes to the identifications provided by the automation and processing images
accurately within a five-second window. There were also three secondary tasks that are
typical of UAS operations to which the participants had to respond as quickly as they
could. Both system reliability and task uncertainty were found to be significant for
primary task image processing time. In contrast, accuracy was not found to be
significantly affected by either one of the independent variables. The results are
examined, and recommendations for future research are discussed.
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgements

iii

Abstract

iv

List of Tables

v

List of Figures

vi

Introduction

1

UAS Background

1

Decision-Making Under Uncertainty

7

Time Pressure and Stress

9

System Reliability

11

Human Trust and Overreliance in Automation

13

Research Objective

16

Statement of Hypotheses

16

Methods

18

Participants

18

Apparatus

18

Design

19

Primary Task

19

Secondary Task

20

Independent Variables

,

Dependent Variables

22

Procedure
Results

21

22
,

23
v

Primary Task

23

Primary Task Image Processing Accuracy

23

Primary Task Image Processing Time

26

Secondary Tasks Processing Time
Discussion
Primary Task
Primary Task Performance Measures
Secondary Task
Secondary Task Performance Measures

29
34
35
35
36
36

Study Limitations

38

Recommendations for Future Research

39

Conclusion

40

References

42

Appendix A

45

VI

List of Tables
Table 1 Design of the reliability and uncertainty study

19

Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Primary Task Accuracy

24

Table 3 ANOVA Source Table for Primary Task Accuracy (%)

24

Table 4 ANOVA Source Table for Primary Task Processing Time (ms)

28

Table 5 ANOVA Source Table for MMI Processing Time

30

Table 6 ANOVA Source Table for Pop-Up Threats Reroute Processing Time

32

Table 7 ANOVA Source Table for IA Processing Time

33

vn

List of Figures

Figure 1 The Relationship Between System Reliability and Trust in Automation

14

Figure 2 The TSD and IMD Using The MIIIRO Interface

19

Figure 3 Average Accuracy Scores for High and Low Uncertainty

25

Figure 4 Average Accuracy Scores for High and Low System Reliability

26

Figure 5 Average Processing Time for High and Low Uncertainty in (ms)

28

Figure 6 Average Processing Time for High and Low System Reliability in (ms)

29

Figure 7 Average MMI Processing Time under High and Low Uncertainty in (ms)

31

vm

Introduction
UAS Background
For many years, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) have been widely used by the
branches of the military in the United States. These systems have demonstrated time and
time again how versatile, effective, and useful they can be. For these reasons, it was
expected that by 2010, 1 out of every 3 military aircraft would be operated remotely
(Pedersen, Cooke, Pringle, & Connor, 2006). For now, UASs fly in restricted zones just
for them but this will soon change. UASs will be introduced to the National Airspace
System (NAS) in the near future, which has sparked some concerns. The branches of the
military have primarily used UASs for reconnaissance and attack missions. With the
revamping of the NAS, the reality of more UASs being utilized for missions other than
military applications is closer than ever. The expansion of UAS operations has the
potential to change aviation forever. Moreover, with the increased potential uses of
UASs, it is suggested that the use of UASs in an "urban close-air support"' will be
invaluable in the years to come, when undertakings like the war on terror creates
missions that are more urban in nature (Hottman & Sortland, 2006).
The environment and intended mission scenarios in which UASs operate differ
significantly. These technologies have advanced to the point where their applications can
be useful for many practical purposes such as drug banning, border monitoring, law
enforcement, agriculture, communication relays, aerial photography and mapping,
emergency management, and scientific and environmental research. For some of these
fields, UASs are already in use but not quite as extensive as it could be. To suffice for
each intended domain of operation, user-interfaces would ultimately need to be designed
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in a fashion that allows for the most effective means of operation, thereby requiring
different operating tasks on behalf of the UAS pilots (Hottman & Sortland, 2006).
UASs have been around for approximately 100 years, but it hasn't been until
recently that their capabilities have been recognized. Shortly after World War I, UAS
technologies really began to develop, following the advent of automatic stabilization,
remote control, and autonomous navigation advancements. Today, the military relies
heavily on UAS to conduct missions that would otherwise be too boring, risky, or
impractical for manned flight. These missions are often referred to as the "Dull, Dirty, or
Dangerous" (Hottman & Sortland, 2006). The enormous growth of military interest
towards UAS is a direct result of their proven performance and capabilities in the realm
of surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence gathering, and more recently- attack
missions (Hottman & Sortland, 2006). Furthermore, UASs accomplish this effort without
putting American pilots' lives in danger, due to the missions being remotely flown by
operators residing within the U.S. borders, not in the hostile airspace. While the idea
behind unmanned flight is to avoid the risk to human life, there is still a cost associated
with losing a UAS; accident rates for UASs far exceed those of manned aircraft.
Moreover, according to Sniezek et al., "an industry analysis has shown that over 70% of
accidents can be attributed to human error" (2001). While proper pilot selection and
training can greatly reduce accidents, it is by no means the only solution to reducing
human error in UAS flights; effective training along with proper automation, userfriendly interfaces, and appropriate procedures can together make a positive impact in the
safety record of UASs (Parush, 2006).
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Within the United States, there are four different possible markets that could
potentially benefit from the expansion of UAS operations: military, civil government,
research, and commercial applications (Reynolds, 2009). Each market will have its own
set of rules provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Therefore it is
important for the FAA to have full understanding of future implementations of UASs in
those specific domains since not only will the rules change for each domain, but for the
UAS operators as well. Consequently, the success of UAS operations in each market
could depend on the constraints imposed on the operation.
Currently, there is no universally supported definition for modern-day UASs. In
the UAS Roadmap, the Department of Defense (DoD) defines these systems as:
A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses
aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted
remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or non-lethal
payload. Ballistic or semi ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery
projectiles are not considered unmanned aerial vehicles (Department of Defense,
2005).
The FAA defines an UAS as:
An airplane, airship, powered lift, or rotorcraft that operates with the pilot in
command off-board, for purposes other than sport or recreation. It is also known
as unmanned aerial vehicle. UASs are designed for recovered and reused. A UAS
includes all parts of the system (data-link, control station, and so forth) required to
operate the aircraft (American Society of Testing and Materials, 2005).

In either definition, a pilot is not co-located within the flying component of the
system. For this reason, human factors concerns are raised regarding the pilot and their
integration into the system for effective operations (Hottman & Sortland, 2006).
UASs come in two varieties: some are controlled from a remote location, and
others fly autonomously based on pre-programmed flight plans using more complex
dynamic automation systems. For both types, though, an operator has to be in the loop,
where the operator interacts with the system, to either control the UAS or supervise it. In
many of the supervisory instances, UASs are used as "eyes in the sky" and need someone
to analyze, interpret, and make decisions about what the UASs see.
Since the pilots of these new domains of UAS operations will have different sets
of rules to go by, it is important to understand how pilots are selected now and how this
practice could improve for future pilot selection. Within the branches of the military, the
primary users of UASs, there is no consistency when it comes to pilot selection. The
U.S. Air Force, for example, select from UAS pilot candidates who have received formal
military flight training, but have recently trained specifically for UAS (Brinkerhoff,
2009). They take graduates who have flown, "airplanes such as B-52, T-38, T-37, and T1" and guide through rigorous UAV training, which results in trained pilots to be taken
away from manned aircraft duties (Pedersen et al., 2006). Furthermore, the U. S. Navy
and Marine Corp select UAS pilots that already hold a private pilot license, which is
more of a "middle of the road" approach (McCarley & Wickens, 2004). On the other
hand, the U. S. Army selects enlisted personnel at boot camp who may or may not have
flight experience to fly their UASs (Pedersen et al, 2006). The lack of standardization
does not stop there. There are also major differences between medical qualifications and
4

restrictions, not only from branch to branch, but in the general sense between manned and
unmanned aircraft pilots. Although some medical qualifications in place for manned
aircraft pilots, such as a certain level of fitness, may not necessarily be crucial for UAS
operators considering the different operational environment, some are understandably
important. Medical restrictions like the one imposed on alcoholics should be mandatory
across the board since UAS operators will be in air space with manned aircraft, posing a
major safety concern.
In order to understand the implications of automation, human trust, workload,
time pressure on operator performance, there needs to be an understanding of the nature
of the task. Operating a UAS is different from flying an aircraft. According to McCarley
and Wickens (2004), "delayed control feedback, poor visual imagery, a small field of
view, and a general lack of sensory cues [and feedback]" are the major differences
between operating a UAS and flying an aircraft. Those extra sensory cues give the pilot
extra information, which usually comes with added experience. Saying that, an
experienced pilot will not necessarily effectively transfer knowledge and experience from
their field to UAS operations. Tirre (1998) explains that pilots transitioning from manned
aircraft to "UAS operations have faced boredom and difficulty maintaining situation
awareness". UAS operations are cognitively taxing. Weil et al. (2006) point up that
operators are responsible for "controlling the flight, navigation, status monitoring, flight
and mission alterations, problem diagnosis, communication and coordination with other
operators and data analysis and interpretation". They continue by saying that those tasks
are similar in terms of their "locus of control" but they have different information
requirements and thus, tap into different cognitive skills, which is were the cognitive
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demands becomes so taxing (Weil et al., 2006). In addition, limited research in this area
has concluded that there is a wide range of necessary qualifications that exist amongst
UAS pilots, and more research is crucial to identify the kinds of skills, training and
previous knowledge that would best fit into UAS operations, while not having a
counterproductive effect (Weeks, 2000).
For any use of the UAS, three goals that are directly related to the Human Factors
field stand true: the ergonomic goal dealing with minimizing physical fatigue, the
cognitive goal that is preoccupied with minimizing mental fatigue and lastly, the response
goal which targets minimizing UAV [operation or task] response time (Pedersen et al.,
2006). The present study is particularly interested in the latter while focusing efforts on a
variation of the cognitive goal as well. In this study, the cognitive goal is more about
perceived workload, which may be impacted by the operator's trust in the system. In turn,
operator's trust can be impacted by the reliability of the system and the task at hand.
In the following sections, we will explore and explain some of the most important
questions regarding UAS pilots, their performance and the factors that are likely to
negatively impact it. Due to the nature of the UAS task, the following factors are usually
involved: decision-making under uncertainty, time pressure and stress, system reliability
issues and the operator's trust in the system, and overreliance in automation. The study
strives to focus particularly on those areas to better understand the UAS operator's task,
how to improve their experience and better address concerns for the future
implementations of UAS s.

6

Decision-Making under Uncertainty

Uncertainty is a major stressor that is likely to have a negative impact on
decision-making. Decision-making under uncertainty is an essential part of UAS
operations, especially in military applications. In military operations, UAS pilots have to
differentiate between targets and distracters when they are in the field, all while staring at
a very small screen. These screens may not have the best resolution and may lack
additional cues to allow the operator an easy discrimination. With the lack of external
cues and only relying on what the small screen gives them, uncertainty can increase the
operator's workloads and stress levels while delaying their response to complete a certain
task; that in turn, can increase their perceived time pressure and thus contribute to poor
performance.
Several studies of decision-making, "suggest that judgment depends on
processing a memory store 'schemata', stereotypical representation of situations
experienced previously" (Boreham, 1989). Uncertainty has been defined extensively.
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) defined uncertainty as consisting of three components: 1)
the lack of clarity of information, 2) the long time span without definite feedback and 3)
the general vagueness of causal relationships. Moreover, uncertainty can be classified
into two quite distinct categories. According to Rastegary and Landy (1993), these two
categories are: 1) the variability of a given situation and 2) the character of information
regarding that situation. For the purposes of this study, uncertainty is defined as the
second category; uncertainty tends to "emphasize the completeness (or lack thereof) of
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the information a decision maker possesses regarding a given situation" (Rastegary &
Landy, 1993).
There are several decision-making models that could illustrate the way a UAS
operator manages to make decisions under a degree of uncertainty. The 'fast-and-frugal'
method is a variation of the Probabilistic Mental Models (PMM) (Newell, Weston &
Shanks, 2003).

The authors explain that the 'fast-and-frugal' approach to decision

making argues that "people 'satisfy' or look for 'good enough' solutions that approximate
the accuracy of the optimal algorithms without placing too heavy a demand on the
cognitive system; this aspect of the model may not apply to military operations since
'good enough' is not quite enough to complete a mission where lives are at stake. In
military operations, the UAS operator must be very certain when discriminating between
targets and friendlies. The 'good enough' idea will likely be applicable to border patrol,
or other civilian applications that not require critical discrimination in behalf of the
operator. Another part to that idea is called the "take-the-best" heuristic, which will better
encompass UAS operations in a military domain. This heuristic has three aspects: the
search rule (search for cues to validate a decision), the stopping rule (stop after the first
discriminating cue is discovered) and the decision rule (choose the outcome pointed to by
the first cue that discriminates). The problem comes, as Newell and colleagues found,
when people do not stop after finding the discriminating cue. Some people tend to seek
additional information to support their decisions. This could be of critical importance in a
UAS task considering the lack of time facing a UAS operator. If a UAS operator looks
for additional, unnecessary information to decide whether or not to do something, they
could waste precious time.
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Furthermore, Jha and Bisantz (2001) suggest that a Dynamic Decision Making
(DDM) task is "a task where the decision maker must make decisions in an uncertain,
changing and time-pressured environment". These tasks involve a recognition process,
where decisions are made based on previous experience. Additionally, dynamic decisions
are defined as having four distinct characteristics:
1) A series of decisions is required to reach one goal;
2) Decisions are interdependent. Each decision needs to be understood in the
context of the other decisions in the series either because they are constrained by
the earlier decisions, or because they may constrain later decisions;
3) The state of the decision problem changes over time, either autonomously,
because of the system makes the decision, or as a consequence of decision
makers' actions;
4) Decisions occur in real time. The decision maker must make a decision when
the environment requires it, not in her or his own time. This is a stress generator,
which hinders decision performance, since the decision maker under stress reverts
to simple, more task-oriented modus operandi (Bullen & Sacks, 2003).
Time Pressure and Stress
Another important aspect of UAS operations is operator's perceived time pressure
to successfully complete a task and the stress that they can experience if the pressure
becomes overwhelming. Controlling a UAS can become quite stressful considering the
small visual system given to operators to make decisions; it is easy to imagine that the

9

task of discriminating between images can rapidly become taxing if there is a time
constrain to complete the task. In addition, the lack of sensory cues, such as visual and
tactile, to inform the operator of current system or task status that could potentially aid
the operator in making a decision are not available like they are in other aircraft. It is
important to understand how time pressure affects UAS operators in their ability to make
correct decisions of critical importance and how stress plays a role in their overall
experience.
In an environment with time sensitive decisions such as UAS operations,
operators are not "free to make decisions when they feel ready to do so. Instead, they
have to make decisions when the environment demands decisions from them, [which]
introduces a level of stress" (Brehmer, 1992). Time pressure is a simple concept. Time
pressure is the perceived demand between the available time and the amount of time
required to complete a given task. Time pressure affects people in different ways. Some
people may cope with high time pressure to make a decision by rushing through other
activities; this will likely end in information overload ultimately resulting in increased
stress levels. According to Maule et al. (2000), this adaptation in known as acceleration,
which they explain as, "increasing the speed or tempo of information processing" and add
that another adaptation strategy is knows as filtration, which dictates, "increased
selectivity of processing". Since the operator is aware of the need to work harder and
faster, it will lead to increased anxiety and stress (Maule et al., 2000).
Perceived time pressure can also prove critical to performance by increasing
workload and completely overwhelming the operator. Time pressure becomes an
important factor to be considered in a dynamic environment such as UAS Operations
10

because decisions have to be made immediately. Brehmer (1992) expresses that, "it [is]
not sufficient to make correct decisions and to make them in the correct order; the
decisions have to be made at the correct time...dynamic decisions are decisions in
context and in time". Not all time pressure is bad. People have been found to feel more
energetic after brief periods of increased workload (Brehmer, 1992). Furthermore, giving
people deadlines can keep them focused on the task while motivating them to
successfully bring the task to completion; this can translate in job satisfaction.
System Reliability
Complexity in technology has been on the rise for many years. In an effort to help
the operator, many tasks have been automated to prevent the user from getting
overwhelmed. As a result of an increase in computer usage, special attention must be paid
to the human-computer team and its performance.
With the human-computer team, a mutual reliance exists. The human will have
assistance from the computer automation, while at the same time the automation relies on
the human to make ultimate decisions based on its suggestions; but having a computer in
the loop is not the end of it. It is not just necessary to have the automation take some of
the work; the automation has to be reliable. Otherwise, instead of reducing operator
workload, the automation can increase it. The reliability of the automation system is the
usual sense of proper, consistent and effective functioning (Luz, 2009). Also, "one
strategy used to optimize human-computer performance has been to call on system
designers to create automated aids that are increasingly more reliable", expecting that the
new found assistance can prove beneficial to the operator of the complex system
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(Dzindolet, Peterson, Pomranky, Pierce, & Beck, 2003). The authors explain that even
though increased reliability is assumed to lead to increased human-computer "team"
performance, it may not be the case every time. Just like with human teams, increasing
the reliability of one member's performance will not necessarily translate into better
team's performance.
Operators depend on the system's reliability to properly aid them in their task. As
UAS use continues to proliferate, "the technology involved with the flight control system
continues to become more and more sophisticated" as if the goal of system designers was
to removed the human operator al together (Williams, 2006) but the rationale for
continuing to use a human in the UAS loop, is the "the flexibility that the human brings
to the human-machine combination" (Oron-Gilad, Chen & Hancock, 2006). In addition,
human-automation interaction research has shown that automation does not eliminate
human cognitive demands in their entirety, set up and supervision of that automation is
still required, with supervision being quite important due to automation being less that
100% reliable (Wickens et al., 2006). For that reason, system reliability and the ability of
the operator to trust the system is crucial. The proper use of such automation is directly
derived from the reliability of the system and the trust the operator can build from using
that system. Experiments have shown that automation is beneficial when it is perfect and
it is also detrimental to operator performance when it is unreliable because it degrades
performance and increases workload (Wickens et al., 2006). The authors indicate that,
"people generally tend to treat diagnostic automated tasks as 'secondary', buffering the
'primary;' concurrent tasks from whatever resource demands are imposed by decreasing
reliability" (Wickens et al., 2006). The finding in the study conducted by Wickens et al.
12

(2006) also showed that pilots might be able to tolerate less than perfect system
reliability. They suggested that pilots may even be able to tolerate reliability as low as
80%, but they disclosed that this might only be achievable if the pilots are made aware of
the reliability level and the source of the imperfection. This is important for the present
study since participants were not aware of the low reliability or the source of the
imperfection while at the same time, system reliability being well below the 80% level
Wickens and others have discussed.
Human Trust and Overreliance in Automation
Since studies have shown reduced perceived operator's workload when automation
is used for a UAS flight, the use of automation in this field has grown significantly
(Parush, 2006). UASs are heavily automated systems where the operator does more of a
supervisory job as opposed to actually operating the aircraft. With this increase in
functionality, consequences such as reduced situational awareness due to inactivity and
lack of operator involvement in the task, over or under reliance in automation, and
misunderstanding of automation modes can all occur in the human-automation interaction
if not considered up front (Weil et al., 2006). According to Peterson (2010), "The level of
automation implemented in the UAS then becomes an important factor in determining
how safely and efficiently the system will operate in general, which is why special
attention must be paid to the human-machine team. Just like in any team, there are
several issues that can arise from the interaction between automation and a human
operator. According to Luz (2009), if people don't trust (under-trusting) automation
support, they will not use it (disuse). On the other hand, when there is too much trust by
the operator (over-trusting), the operator incurs in lack of attentive monitoring of the
13

system which will likely lead to missing faults in automation (misuse). It is important that
operator to evaluate the system reliability correctly and build trust on the system
thereafter.
In general, trust can be increased when the operator realizes the benefits of using
automation and understands the functionality and constraints of its tools. The relationship
of system reliability and trust in automation is illustrated in Figure 1.
High

Trust

Low
Low

System Reliability

High

Figure 1 The Relationship Between System Reliability and Trust in Automation

Automation can be a very powerful tool for a human operator but if not handled
carefully, it can hinder the ability of the user in executing the correct response under
time pressure or an emergency situation as well as increasing their workload. The
interaction between an autonomous system and the operator is an interesting one, "a
common paradigm in human-automation interaction requires a human to make a
14

judgment in parallel with an automated system, and then consider, accept of reject the
automated output as appropriate" (Bisantz & Pritchett, 2003). This becomes a problem
when the operator becomes over reliant on the system and goes from an active operator
to a monitor. If the system takes too many responsibilities away from the user, making
them less involved in what is going on, when an emergency situation happens the
operator is less equipped to manage it properly. This, in turn, elevates the levels of
workload immensely and performance usually decreases. Overreliance on automation
can be extremely critical for UAS missions since important, time-constrained decisions
can happen in an instant and the operator must be alert, in the loop and able to make the
right decision.
In UAS operations, research about workload, trust in automation and system
reliability and how they affect operator's performance is limited. This study will add to
the body of knowledge that currently exists about these systems. The expansion that the
UAS usage will have in the upcoming years will greatly benefit from a better
understanding of the dynamics between system reliability and human trust and their
impact of workload and performance when time pressure is added to the mix.
Research Objective
The purpose of the study is to broaden the understanding of the effects of system
reliability and task uncertainty on UAS operator performance. Due to the vast number of
UAS applications, concerns such as: Are pilots able to use the automation properly when
it is less than perfect? Does low reliability affect their performance? Can reliable
automation really have a positive impact on operator's performance? Does low reliability
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hinder the operator's positive perception of the system automation, therefore affecting
their performance? Can time pressure become critical when the uncertainty of the
discrimination task is high?
The objective is for the study is to find out if under a high time pressure, UAV
operators are able to correctly discriminate between distracters and threats while properly
accepting correct automation data or rejecting faulty data based on the two levels of
system reliability. The uncertainty encompassed in the study, is threat detection; the ease
of looking at an image with all threats, mixed threats and distracters or all distracters and
correcting the action the automation has suggested. The effect of system reliability and
different uncertainty levels on human UAS operators were investigated in this study.
Hypotheses
The following hypotheses were tested:
Hypothesis 1:

When participants are exposed to high uncertainty targets, that is,
all threats or all distracters, they will have a lower accuracy score
than when presented with low uncertainty targets.

Hypothesis 2:

When participants are exposed to low uncertainty, their primary
task processing time will be lower than when presented with high
uncertainty targets.

Hypothesis 3:

When participants are exposed to high system reliability, their
primary task accuracy scores will be higher than when they are
presented with low reliability.

Hypotheses 4:

When participants are exposed to high system reliability, their
16

primary task processing time will be lower than when they are
presented with low system reliability.
Hypotheses 5:

There is an interaction between reliability and uncertainty for the
primary task accuracy scores

Hypothesis 6:

There is an interaction effect between reliability and uncertainty
for the primary task processing time

Hypothesis 7:

When participants are exposed to low uncertainty targets, their
secondary task time, mission mode indicator MMI processing time
will be lower than when presented with high uncertainty targets.

Hypothesis 8:

When participants are exposed to high reliability, their secondary
task time, MMI processing time will be lower than when presented
with low system reliability.

Hypothesis 9:

When participants are exposed to low uncertainty, their secondary
task time, pop-up threats processing time will be lower than when
presented with high uncertainty targets.

Hypothesis 10:

When participants are exposed to high reliability, their secondary
task time, pop-up threats processing time will be lower than when
presented with low system reliability.

Hypothesis 11:

When participants are exposed to low uncertainty, their secondary
task time, Intruder Aircraft (IA) processing time will be lower than
when presented with high uncertainty targets.

Hypothesis 12:

When participants are exposed to high reliability, their secondary
task time, Intruder Aircraft (IA) processing time will be lower than
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when presented with low system reliability.
Hypothesis 13:

There is an interaction between reliability and uncertainty for the
secondary task time.
Methods

Participants
Twenty-five undergraduate and graduate students from Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University, 15 males (60%) and 10 females (40%) were recruited to
participate in this study. They were briefed prior to their participation and asked to sign
an informed consent form.
Apparatus
This study used a standard PC running a UAS software test bed simulation device
called MIIIRO (Multi-modal Immersive Intelligent Interface for Remote Operations).
The software was designed by IA Tech with support from the Air Force Research
Laboratory, and is used to conduct research for simulate long range, and high endurance
UASs (Tso et al., 1999). The setup includes two monitors; the one on the left displayed
the Tactical Situation Display (TSD). The TSD included a topographical image of the
operating environment, highlighted routes including waypoints, critical targets, other
intruding aircraft, and the Mission Mode Indicators (MMI). The secondary monitor
displayed the Image Management Display (IMD), which included an image cue and
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image display used for image processing, as shown in Figure 2.

'«#fl*

Figure 2 The TSD and IMD using the MIIIRO interface
Design
The design utilized a 2x2 within subjects, fully factorial design (Table 1). The
two independent variables were reliability of the automation and uncertainty of the
data presented. Five dependent measures were collected in the study across two
tasks.
Table 1
Design of the reliability and uncertainty study
Uncertainty
Reliability

50%
90%

High

Low

X
X

X
X

Primary task. For this study, the primary task was image processing. Participants
did not need to control flight directly due to the high level of automation used by the
system. Waypoints made up the flight path of the UAS. Along the flight path, 10 image
capture locations were preset to represent each location. Once the UAS reached a
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waypoint, the designated image was presented to the participants. Each image contained
at least one terrain vehicle that may have or may have not been a target. Distracters may
have also been present. The participants were to view the images captured by the aircraft
onboard camera, and verify that the Automatic Target Recognizer (ATR) had correctly
selected the targets. The ATR placed a red box around the vehicles it had recognized as
targets, although the ATR was not always correct. For example, the ATR placed red
boxes around distracters while not placing them around the targets. In cases where the
ATR had incorrectly identified distracters as targets or had not recognized a target as one,
the participant was required to manually select the target and/or deselect the distracter by
clicking on the images with the mouse. The automation processed the automation's
suggested action as is, if no input from the operator was received within the 5 seconds
time limit. The reliability of the ATR was set to 90% and 50% for the two levels of
reliability.
The MIIIRO software automatically collected primary task performance measures
for analyses. These measures included: image processing time, target selection accuracy,
manual accepts/rejects, and automatic accepts/rejects.
Secondary task. There were three secondary tasks that the participants needed to
perform during this study. The first task was the Mission Mode Indicator (MMI). The
MMI had three round lights organized in a line like a sideways traffic light. It indicated
the status of the UAS by lighting up the green, yellow, or red light. The lights depicted
the estate of the system: good health (green), action needed (yellow), and urgent action
needed (red). The participants needed to click on the light panel when the MMI lighted
up yellow or red. They then needed to correctly type in a text string that popped up in a
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window after initiating the action. Once the participants had successfully entered the text
string presented to them, the MMI lighted up green indicating the new state of the system
as being in good health.
The second task in this experiment required the participant to respond to flight
path changes recommendations made by the automation. Pop-up threats were designed
into the flight path, but were not visible to the participant until the aircraft had
encountered them. When the UAS encountered the threats, the automation provided an
alternate route. The alternate route provided was not always ideal and the participant had
to choose to accept the new route before it was put in effect or rejected it and continue
with the original flight plan.
Lastly, the third task to increase pilot workload consisted of processing an
Intruder Aircraft (IA), which entered the operational airspace. This task was used to
imitate unexpected aircraft that may enter airspace during typical UAS operations. This
was a highly critical situation and required a quick and attentive response. A red aircraft
shaped icon depicted as the intruder, appeared on the display at random times during the
experiment. Participants were required to click on the aircraft and enter a predetermined
code to alleviate the situation. This event occurred twice in each trial.
Data from all three tasks was automatically collected by the MIIIRO software and
included the number of events and response times for the MMI and the IA, as well as the
pop-up threat reroute occurrences.
Independent variables. The first independent variable (IV) was reliability of the
system. It had 2 levels: 50% and 90%. When the reliability was set at 50%, 5 images out
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of the 10 images captured by the aircraft onboard camera were correctly processed; the
automation had red boxes around the targets and no boxes around distracters. This was
also the case for the 90% reliability where 9 out of the 10 images were correctly
processed by the automation. The second IV was task uncertainty. It too had 2 levels:
Low (with comparison) and High (without comparison). For the comparison group, there
was a mixture of threats and distracters and the participant had a comparison point to
discriminate one from the other. For the without comparison group, participants were
presented with either all threats or all distracters and they had to make decisions based on
what they thought was differentiable on the screen.
Dependent variables. Performance from the primary task was measured based
processing time and accuracy scores and the secondary tasks were measured based on
processing time.
Procedure
Upon arrival, each participant was given an informed consent form to sign
(Appendix A). Then, they were briefed about the primary task as well as the three
secondary tasks. They were also informed that they could receive extra credit in one
undergraduate Human Factors class in addition to being eligible for a $50 cash prize if
they were the overall top performer in the study. Before starting the sequence of
scenarios, they were able to get themselves familiarized with the software and all the
tasks as well as ask questions they may have had during a 5-minute trial run. After the
trial run was completed, the participants were presented with a randomized
sequence of the experimental scenarios. Each scenario lasted approximately 8 minutes
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and the total time to complete the study varied from 50 minutes to 1 hour, depending on
individual breaks between scenarios.
Results
The present study was intended to analyze the effects of system reliability and
task uncertainty on performance of UAS pilots under high time pressure. A repeated
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted for each one of the dependent
variables: primary image processing accuracy, primary image processing time, MMI
processing time, pop-up threats reroute processing time and IA processing time. The
significance level was set at alpha ~ .05 and the graphs shown below include standard
error bars.
Primary Task
Primary task image processing accuracy. For the first primary task dependent
variable (DV), accuracy, an ANOVA was conducted to test hypothesis 1 and hypothesis
3. Hypothesis 1 states that when participants are exposed to high uncertainty targets, that
is, all threats or all distracters, they will have a lower accuracy score than when presented
with low uncertainty targets. Hypothesis 3 states that when participants are exposed to
high system reliability, their primary task accuracy scores will be higher than when they
are presented with low reliability. The descriptive statistics for accuracy are shown in
Table 2.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Primary Task Accuracy
Uncertainty
High
Mean

Low

SD

95% C.I

Mean

SD

95% C.I.

50% 64.17

20.412

[55.5,72.8]

70.42

19.886

[62.0,78.8]

90% 72.08

18.645

[64.2,80.0]

68.33

16.854

[61.2,75.5]

Reliability

The main effects for system reliability and task uncertainty on accuracy were F(l,
23)= 1.056, p=.315 and F(l, 23)=. 120, p=J33 respectively. Both did not reach statistical
significance. The interaction effect between reliability and uncertainty was found to not
be statistically significant with, F(l, 23)=2.968, and/?=.098. Partial Eta Square was .044
for reliability and .005 for uncertainty, which means that each factor accounted for 4.4%
and .5% of the variance respectively. Also, power was low at .166 for reliability and at
.063 for uncertainty. This means that for reliability, there is 83.4% chance of failing to
detect an effect that is there and for uncertainty, there is a 93.7% chance. The results are
shown in Table 3.
Table 3
ANOVA Source Table for Primary Task Accuracy (%)
j*
dj

TV/ro
MS

Reliability

1

204.167

Uncertainty

1

37.5000

Reliability*Uncertainty

1

600.000

Error(Reliability)

23

193.297

Error(Uncertainty)

23

313.587

Z7
F

p
_

2
n
\

Observed
_
Power

1.056

.315

.044

.166

.120

.733

.005

.063

2.968

.098

.114

.379
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Also, Figure 3 shows that based on the data, it seems that when participants were
exposed to high uncertainty targets, their accuracy scores were lower but according to the
analysis, the difference was not statistically significant. Hypothesis 1 was not supported
by the findings.

Average Image Processing
Accuracy

Figure 3 Average Accuracy Scores for High and Low Uncertainty
As for Hypothesis 3, Figure 4 shows from the data, it appears that when
participants were exposed to the high reliability condition, they had higher accuracy
scores, but this too was not found to be statistically significant.
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Average Image Processing
Accuracy
72
70
68
#

66
64
62
60
High Reliability

Low Reliability

Figure 4 Average Accuracy Scores for High and Low System Reliability

Primary task image processing time. A separate repeated measures ANOVA was
conducted to analyze the effects of reliability and uncertainty on the second performance
measure for the primary task, and image processing time. For image processing time,
hypotheses 2 and 4 stated that: (2) when participants are exposed to low uncertainty, their
primary task processing time will be lower than when presented with high uncertainty
targets and (4) whenparticipants are exposed to high system reliability, their primary task
processing time will be lower than when they are presented with low system reliability,
respectively. The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4.
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for Primary Task Time (ms)
Uncertainty
Low

High
SD

95% C.I

Mean

SD

95% C.I.

50% 3607.96

1029.57

[3173,4042]

3173.58

768.311

[2849, 3498]

90% 3272.00

1114.72

[2801,3742]

2905.62

743.066

[2591,3219]

Mean

Reliability

It was found that there was a significant main effect for system reliability with
F(l, 23)= 7.581 and/?=011. There was also a significant main effect for uncertainty of
the task with F(l, 23)=8.809 and p=.007. However, the interaction effect between
reliability and uncertainty was not found to be statistically significant with F(l, 23)= .063
and p=.804. Partial Eta Square was .248 for reliability and .277 for uncertainty, which
means that each factor accounted for 24.8% and 27.7% of the variance respectively. Also,
power was relatively high at .751 for reliability and at .811 for uncertainty. This means
that for reliability, there is 24.9% chance of failing to detect an effect that is there and for
uncertainty, there is an 18.9% chance. The ANOVA source table is shown in Table 5.
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Table 5
ANOVA Source Table for Primary Task Processing Time (ms)
df

MS

1

2188292.042 7.581

.011* .248

Observed
Power
.751

Uncertainty

3847203.375

8.809

.007* .277

.811

Reliability*Uncertainty

27744.00

.063

.804

.057

Reliability

Error(Reliability)

23

288657.911

Error(Uncertainty)

23

436733.766

F

p

T)

.003

* indicated significant factors
Also, Figure 5 shows that when participants were exposed to low uncertainty
targets, their processing time was significantly lower. Hypothesis 2 was supported by the
findings.

Average Image Processing Time

High Uncertainty

Low Uncertainty

Figure 5 Average Processing Time for High and Low Uncertainty in (ms)
In addition, Figure 6 shows that when presented with high system reliability,
participants processed images quicker than when they were exposed to low system
reliability. The findings also support hypothesis 4.
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Average Image Processing Time
3700
3600
3500
3400
_ 3300
j§ 3200
W
3100
3000
2900
2800
2700

High Reliability

Low Reliability

Figure 6 Average Processing Time for High and Low System Reliability in (ms)
As for the hypotheses 5 and 6, which relate to the interaction between reliability
and uncertainty for the primary task accuracy scores (5) and primary task image
processing time (6), the findings do not support either one of the hypotheses.
Secondary Tasks Processing Time
The first secondary task analyzed using repeated measures ANOVA was Mission
Mode Indicator (MMI) processing time and the descriptive statistics are shown in Table

Table 6
Descriptive Statistics for MMI processing time (ms)

Uncertainty
High
Mean

Low

SD

95% C.I

Mean

SD

95% C.I.

50% 8831.3

2336.41

[7845,9818]

9872.75

2890.92

[8652,11093]

90% 9317.79

2883.66

[8100,10535]

10319.6

2869.78

[9107,11531]

Reliability
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It was found that there was a significant main effect for uncertainty of the task,
F(l, 23)= 15.361, p<.00\. The main effect for reliability of the system was not found to
be significant, F(\, 23)= 1.697. ^=.206 and neither was the interaction, F(l, 23)= .002,
p=.969. Partial Eta Square was .069 for reliability and .400 for uncertainty, which means
that each factor accounted for 6.9% and 40% of the variance respectively. Also, power
was low for reliability at .239 for reliability and high for uncertainty at .963. This means
that although there is 76.1% chance of failing to detect an effect that is there for
reliability, for uncertainty, there is a very low 3.7% chance of failing to detect an effect.
The results are shown in Table 7,
Table 7
ANOVA Source Table for MMI Processing Time
,r

Tl/rc

rr
F

2
P

Observed

df

MS

Reliability

1

5229000.260

1.697

.206

Uncertainty

1

25050000.00

15.361

.001* .400

.963

Reliability*Uncertainty

1

9500.260

.002

.969

.050

Error(Reliability)

23

70870000.00

Error(Uncertainty)

23

37510000.00

1
.069

.000

Power
.239

* indicates significant factors
Hypothesis 7 predicted that when participants are exposed to low uncertainty,
their MMI processing time will be lower than when presented with high uncertainty
targets. This was not supported by the findings (see Figure 7). Therefore, results suggest
that participants took longer to process the MMI task when the primary task uncertainty
was low. Hypothesis 8 is not supported either and states that when participants are
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exposed to high reliability, their MMI processing time will be lower than when presented
with low system reliability since reliability was not found to be statistically significant.

Average MMI Processing Time
12000
10000
8000
f

6000
4000
2000

!

o
High Uncertainty

Low Uncertainty

i

j

Figure 7 Average MMI Processing Time under High and Low Uncertainty in (ms)
The next secondary task analyzed was pop-up threats reroute processing time. The
descriptive statistics are shown in Table 8.
Table 8
Descriptive Statistics for Pop-Up Threats Reroute Processing Time (ms)
Uncertainty
High
Mean

Low

SD

95% C.I

Mean

SD

95% C.I.

50% 2834.75

902.854

[2453,3216]

2852.50

936.908

[2457,3248]

90%

845.464

[2716,3430]

2686.96

817.469

[2342,3032]

Reliability
3073.27

The main effects for reliability with F(l, 23)=.077, p=.7S4 and for uncertainty
with F(l, 23)= 1.780,/?=. 195 were not found to be statistically significant. The interaction
between reliability and uncertainty also failed to show a significance with F(l,
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23)=1.850, /?=.187. As previously stated, hypotheses 9 and 10 predicted that when
participants are exposed to low uncertainty and high reliability their pop-up threats
reroute processing time will be lower than when presented with high uncertainty targets
and low system reliability respectively. Since the repeated measures ANOVA did not
find statistical significance for either one of the IVs nor their interaction, hypothesis 9
and hypothesis 10 were not supported. The ANOVA source table is shown below (see
Table 9).
Table 9
ANOVA Source Table for Pop-Up Threats Reroute Processing Time (ms)
df,.

, , S„
M

„
F

p

2
T\

Observed
pow£r

Reliability

1

31937.510

.077

.784

.003

.058

Uncertainty

1

814937.760

1.780

.195

.072

.248

Reliability*Uncertainty

1

979498.010

1.850

.187

.074

.256

Error(Reliability)

23

413498.532

Error(Uncertainty)

23

10530000.00

Lastly, the Intruder Aircraft (IA) processing time was analyzed for which the
descriptive statistics are shown below in Table 10.
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Table 10
Descriptive Statistics for IA Processing Time (ms)
Uncertainty
High
Mean

Low

SD

95% C.I

Mean

SD

95% C.I.

1721.638

[4867,6393]

5501.09

1512.364

[4831,6172]

90% 6161.18 2094.812

[5232,7090]

5928.41

1491.270

[5267,6590]

50% 5630.09
Reliability

Similarly to the reroute processing time, the ANOVA did not find a statistically
significant main effect for reliability with F(l, 23)=2.964, p=.\00 or for uncertainty with
F(l, 23)^.252, p=.62l. The interaction between reliability and uncertainty also failed to
show a significance with F(l, 23)=.037, p=.S50. The ANOVA source table is shown
below (see Table 11).
Table 11
ANOVA Source Table for IA Processing Time (ms)
df

MS

F

p

n2

Reliability

1

5052013.92

2.964

.100

.124

Observed
Power
.376

Uncertainty

1

1704728.44

.252

.621

.012

.077

Reliability*Uncertainty

1

59228.284

.037

.850

.002

.054

Error(Reliability)

21

1704728.44

Error(Uncertainty)

21

2853774.38

Hypotheses 11 and 12 predicted that when participants were exposed to low
uncertainty targets and high system reliability, IA processing time was going to be lower
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than when presented with high uncertainty targets and low system reliability respectively.
Since the findings do not support those predictions, we reject hypothesis 11 as well as
hypothesis 12. As for hypothesis 13 that deals with the interaction effect between
reliability and uncertainty and it affecting secondary task time, we reject this hypothesis
because none of the three secondary tasks processing times showed a statistically
significant interaction effect. In the next section, the major findings of the study are
discussed.
Discussion
The objective of this study was to examine the effects of system reliability and
task uncertainty on performance under high time pressure when conducting unmanned
aerial vehicle operations. The aim of the study was to further the understanding of how
system reliability and uncertainty of the task can impact performance in highly
autonomous UASs and use that knowledge to improve future designs as well as
operators' experience. According to the findings, both system reliability and task
uncertainty had a significant effect on primary image processing time but not their
interaction. Furthermore, reliability and uncertainty did not show a statistically significant
main effect on primary task accuracy and neither did their interaction. Similarly, no
significance was found for reliability and uncertainty or their interaction, on secondary
task processing time for intruder aircraft or pop-up threat reroute. Lastly, uncertainty was
found to have a main effect on MMI processing time but reliability was not found to be
statistically significant, and neither was the interaction between reliability and
uncertainty. The results of the performance measures are discussed in two separate
sections, primary task and secondary tasks.
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Primary Task
Primary task performance measures. For the primary task, two different
performance measures were recorded: image processing accuracy and image processing
time. System reliability was not found to be significant for primary task accuracy, which
may be derived from the participant's understanding of the task at hand. Part of the
briefing explained that the system would be unreliable at least once. Participants knew
there were two levels of reliability on which they would be tested and that neither of
which was set up at 100% reliability, but they were not aware of what each level was. A
possible explanation of the lack of significance of reliability on accuracy is that
participants were even more careful when identifying targets and distracters and
processing images in each scenario because they were aware that the system was not set
up to be 100% reliable at any point in the study. Surprisingly and contrary to the
hypothesis, uncertainty of the task had no significance on accuracy either. Processing
both, images where targets and distracters were both present and images where only
targets or distracters were present, had statistically similar accuracy scores. Participants
seemed to have had no added difficulty differentiating targets from distracters when
processing images correctly. The feature difference between targets and distracters was
only color, not shape or size.
Moreover, primary task image processing time showed statistical significance for
both system reliability and task uncertainty but not their interaction. The findings support
the claim that when the reliability of the system is high participants take less time
processing the images; not only is there a higher percentage of images correctly
processed by the automation but there is also less mouse-clicking involved for the
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incorrect images to be corrected therefore saving the participant some time processing the
image. That also holds true that when the task uncertainty is low; when participants have
a way to compare between targets and distracters in an image, they can better
differentiate between distracters and targets and thus process the image faster. On the
other hand, the interaction between reliability and uncertainty was not significant, which
did not support the predictions stipulated. This may be due to the small number of targets
in each imaged captured. It may be possible that the task was not demanding enough to
show a significant interaction and increasing the task demand might show an interaction.
In the next section, the processing times for all three secondary tasks are discussed.
Secondary Tasks
Secondary tasks performance measures. Response time data was collected as the
performance measure for all three secondary tasks and each of which are discussed in the
following order: mission mode indicator (MMI), pop-up threats reroutes and intruder
aircraft (IA). In all the secondary tasks the processing times are a reflection of the
workload experienced by the participants due to system reliability and uncertainty for
their primary task given that participants used their spare capacity. Since participants had
to focus primarily on target/distracter image processing when the task was active, their
processing time with their primary task impacted their processing time for subsequent
secondary tasks.
The MMI processing time only showed that it was significantly affected by
uncertainty; more specifically low uncertainty resulted in higher processing time. This
finding directly contradicts the prediction that stated that MMI processing time would be
lower when participants were exposed to low uncertainty since it would be easier for
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participants to differentiate the targets. The findings showed that MMI processing time
did not reduce when participants were presented with low uncertainty. A possible reason
for this could be that because participants had accomplished the primary task quicker,
they did not feel rushed to input the numeric string presented to them in the pop-up
window to bring the system back to "good health" status. Participants knew that their
primary task was completed; they took their time to complete the secondary task. In
contrast, if participants were presented with high uncertainty on their primary task, and
they had to rush to make a decision quickly in order to successfully complete that task,
they may have carried over some of that sense of urgency to the MMI task, hence
completing it faster. Moreover, system reliability did not show significance in MMI
processing time. Given that participants knew the automation would be unreliable at least
once, they may have taken similar care in their primary task image processing across all
four scenarios, resulting in similar spare time to complete the MMI task. Also, the
interaction between system reliability and task uncertainty did not show statistical
significance for similar reasons. The trend of lack of significance continued with the last
two secondary tasks.
The findings did not support the claims that high system reliability, low
uncertainty and their interaction would have an effect on pop-up threats reroute
processing time and IA processing time. Results showed that pop-up threats reroute
processing times were similar across the board and participants were not affected by the
reliability of the system, the tasks uncertainty or the interaction of the two, when it came
to processing reroutes. A reason for this could be that since they were aware that the
reroute was a time sensitive task, the participants devoted the same amount of resources
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to it regardless of how they reacted to the primary task and the different levels of
reliability and uncertainty presented to them. The IV that affected the primary task had no
impact on secondary tasks resulting in similar spare capacity.
In addition, the IA processing time was not impacted by the independent variables
either. The IA occurred randomly in each scenario, leaving the participant less room to
respond in advance or plan ahead. Since IA requires the same code input, there might be
some learning transferred from the second scenario they were presented with to the third
and fourth. Thus, for IA processing time, the findings did not support the claims that high
system reliability, low uncertainty and their interaction would have an effect. In the next
section, the study limitations are explored.
Study Limitations
In the present study, uncertainty was measured more effectively for the primary
task. However, the secondary tasks did not reflect conclusive results and part of that
might come from secondary tasks processing times being dependent on the primary task
processing time. In addition, the partial eta squared for the primary task processing time
was low, showing that only about 20% of the variance could be accounted for by the
factors. In turn, the observed power for the primary task processing time was not as high,
leaving room for failure to detect an effect when there is one. Moreover, there were no
significant interactions in the study, which could have resulted from the primary task not
being demanding enough to challenge participant's perceived mental workload capacity.
In addition, due to the nature of the study, where participants are exposed to all levels,
there may be some learning effects associated with some aspects of the primary task and
all secondary tasks. Lastly, confounds such as video game proficiency or previous
exposure to similar UAS software, may have impacted participant's response times and
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accuracy scores. Some suggestions are explored in the next section, which provides
recommendation for future research.
Recommendations for Future Research
For research in UAS pilot performance, it is usually helpful to evaluate the level
of perceived workload. The original intention of this study was to also analyze and
evaluate workload. Due to corrupted data, the current study was not able to evaluate how
system reliability and task uncertainty may affect perceived workload. Recommendations
for future studies would be to use NASA-TLX after each on of the scenarios to help
understand if and how reliability and uncertainty affect perceived workload.
Also, increasing task fidelity to be more of what UAS pilots experience in their
stations could shed more light on pilot performance and how to increase it based on
system reliability and task uncertainty understanding. Providing pilots with a continuous
visual feedback and not just image captures when they approach a coded waypoint. If a
flight path provides video-like feedback, the pilot may feel more involved in the task and
thus processing images more accurately. Their perceived workload levels may increase
just enough to where they feel they are in the loop, not over relying on the automation
and keeping a high job satisfaction.
Furthermore, if at all possible, something that would be interesting to investigate
would be if adding visual aids to the workstation versus not having visual aids could
affect the uncertainty of the task, if the visual aid makes the distinction between a target
and a distracter. Since the findings suggest that having comparison present, that is at least
one target and one distracter in an image, allows the pilot to make decisions faster.
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Having something to compare the images the pilot is presented with, can improve their
accuracy and processing time because they are not likely to have both, targets and
distracters, present in every one of the images they have to process.
This type of research will add to the body of knowledge that exists about UAS
operations. Reporting findings that will improve the pilot experience and their
performance will increase the usability of these very efficient and effective systems. By
understanding the implications of system reliability and uncertainty on pilot performance,
we can better design for the future implementations of UASs.
Conclusion

Due to the vast use of UASs in the military, the rapid growth of UAS applications
in many different domains and the imminent integration into the NAS, it is important to
broaden the body of knowledge regarding the UAS pilots' mental processes and what
kind of things affect their performance. The aim of human factors is to foresee areas of
concern and come up with plausible solutions before those areas become serious
problems Performance, job satisfaction, pilot selection and workload are amongst the
areas of interest for UAS operations research. This experiment expands on how system
reliability and task uncertainty affect one of those, performance.
The present study has found that pilots processing time is affected by system
reliability and task uncertainty. The task uncertainty portion may provide important clues
as to what kind of training pilots should be given. In regards to reliability, the study
supports what the literature says; when the reliability is high, processing time goes down.
This indicated that it is important for the reliability of the system to be as good as it can
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be, but something interesting came out of this study. The accuracy was not significantly
affected by the reliability because, like it was mentioned before, the participants were
told that the system was wrong at least once. That made them more involved with the
system and more aware of what they had to do. Pilots may benefit from some kind of
warning that their system will be wrong so that they can perform better instead of over
relying on the automation and going from being a significant part of the human-system
team, to playing a passive role.
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Appendix A
IRB Number: 10-135
Informed Consent Form
For the study:
The Effects of System Reliability and Task Uncertainty on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Operator Performance under High Time Pressure

Conducted by Manuela Jaramillo
Advisor: Dr. Dahai Liu
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
600 S. Clyde Morris Blvd, Daytona Beach, FL 32114
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of System Reliability and task
uncertainty on performance and workload. This experiment consists of one session that
will last approximately forty five minutes. During this session, you will be asked to
complete four computer-based UAS simulations, fill out a short survey after each one and
fill out a questionnaire regarding your perceived feeling of workload at the end of the
session.
Your participation in this study will help us determine an appropriate level of
automation and help distinguish potential pilot candidates for future UASs. There are no
known risks associated with this experiment. The data collected from your participation
will remain confidential. You will be compensated for your participation with extra
credit in an undergraduate course and will be eligible to receive a $50.00 cash prize for
best overall performance. You may terminate your participation at any time.
Thank you for your participation. If you have any questions, please ask during the
experiment, or call Manuela Jaramillo at 863.458.2758 or Dr. Dahai Liu at 386.226.6214.
Statement of Consent
I acknowledge that my participation in this experiment is entirely voluntary and
that I am free to withdraw at any time. I have been informed as to the general scientific
purposes of the experiment and that I will receive extra credit for participation in this
study and will be eligible to receive $50.00 in the event that I have the best overall task
performance in the entire study. Prize money is contingent on completion of the study.
I acknowledge that I have had the opportunity to obtain additional information
regarding the study and that any questions I have raised have been answered to my full
satisfaction.
I have read and fully understand the consent form and I sign it freely and
voluntarily.
Participant's Name:

ID#

Participant's Signature:

Date

Experimenter Signature:

Date
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